South Korea and India have an across-the-board convergence of interests, with few outstanding bilateral issues standing in the way of their relations. For example, both Seoul and New Delhi are dynamic democracies with growing regional and global influence and are united in their shared beliefs of the rule of law and democratic values. The high level of complementarities that exist between the two Asian economic powerhouses means that they have huge potential to tap into by further exploring extant and emerging industrial sectors.
In addition, both of them are firmly committed to preserving the Indo-Pacific regional order, which is rooted in international laws and multilateral norms. For this reason, the two countries, free from any conflict of interest, have developed overall positive and amicable relations over the years.
South Korea recently embraced the geo-strategic construct of the Indo-Pacific in its foreign policy initiative after long-held ambivalence and hesitations. Seoul’s Indo-Pacific vision, put forth by President Yoon in 2022, represents a sharp departure from his predecessor’s strategic ambiguity in recognition of the increasingly tougher Indo-Pacific geopolitical realities.
In this respect, Seoul’s strategic repositioning toward the Indo-Pacific provides fresh opportunities to forge greater strategic convergence with New Delhi’s own Indo-Pacific vision: the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, and overcome its self-imposed political inhibitions, which have hitherto deterred advancing substantive strategic engagement with New Delhi.
In fact, Seoul has already made plenty of significant progress in its Indo-Pacific strategic endeavors, including greater strategic coordination with the U.S. on a host of regional and global challenges, rebuilding relations with Japan from what appeared to be a diplomatic abyss, and the Camp David comprehensive trilateral partnership with these two partners, to name but a few.
However, Seoul’s strategic engagement and security cooperation with New Delhi remains to date pretty underdeveloped, lagging far behind their economic and functional relations. It was only in 2015 that they upgraded their formal relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership. However, on the strategic cooperation front so far, progress is limited.
While both countries have already started high-level talks to improve their strategic coordination and assured each other that they are on the same page to synergize their strategic convergence, India remains a missing link in Seoul’s overall strategic alignments. The challenge is that factors that have pulled Seoul and New Delhi apart, such as a wide expectation gap, a dearth of sustained attention and benign neglect for strategic potentials, still linger, thereby posing as stumbling blocks to advancing strategic trust and communication.
Furthermore, rather than approaching India as a key partner with strategic priority, Seoul tends to perceive New Delhi predominantly through an economic prism that squarely looks for new trade and profit-making opportunities given its vast and fast-growing domestic markets. For this reason, Seoul has yet to fully embrace New Delhi into its Indo-Pacific framework and continues to indulge itself in a short-term transactional approach.
As cogently pointed out by Dr. Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister of India who leads New Delhi’s proactive, forward-looking multi-vector diplomatic initiatives, “Asia is rising but divided.” The increasingly contentious geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region poses serious challenges to the existing rules-based order, which has not only served Seoul’s strategic interests well but also provided the very foundation for its economic prosperity.
While China’s strategic intention is not terribly clear and transparent, the emerging strategic narratives as well as its increasing aggressions in various parts of the Indo-Pacific region, strongly indicate that China’s regional order vision is likely to be at odds with those of Seoul, New Delhi and other like-minded countries. In contrast, New Delhi’s vision is geared toward establishing an inclusive rules-based regional order that is diametrically opposed to the ideas of sphere of influence or regional hegemonic order, for that matter, in the Indo-Pacific. Seoul’s strategic interests are closely tied to the emerging Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamics in which India, as a rising power on the regional as well as global stage, is playing an increasingly pivotal role in shaping a favorable regional balance of power.
Seoul and New Delhi have multiple areas of cooperation in which they can leverage their converging interests and complementary strengths. For example, by coordinating maritime patrols, conducting joint exercises and sharing maritime domain awareness. The two partners can enhance regional security and contribute to strategic stability in the region. Furthermore, Seoul’s advanced technological prowess and industrial base present ample opportunities for collaboration with New Delhi in areas such as maritime trade, infrastructure development, semiconductors, critical and emerging technology and renewable energy.
The current and emerging geopolitical imperatives compel South Korea to look beyond its strategic myopia vis-à-vis India. Seoul cannot afford to keep its strategic complacency toward New Delhi. Seoul needs a new and bold imagination that allows broadening the horizons of its strategic geography and engaging New Delhi as the quintessential partner in its evolving strategic thinking.
Choe Won-gi (@WongiChoe) is professor and head of Center for ASEAN-India Studies at Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Shristi Pukhrem is deputy director in Academics & Research at India Foundation.