Recent Japanese moves to shift away from a pacifist policy should facilitate such alignment.
Following the 2022 assassination of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was a keen proponent of Japan building up its armed forces, the Japanese government has been gradually moving away from a pacifist stance. In December 2022, under the new Premier Fumio Kishida, the island-nation formulated its first National Defence Strategy (NDS) and shortly thereafter developed a Defence Build-up Programme (DBP). In justifying this shift, the ruling LDP leadership noted that Japan was “facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.” Without directly naming China but in no uncertain terms, Kishida had observed that its rise was “the greatest strategic challenge that Japan has ever faced”.
Politically, as well as administratively, Japan has decided to create a counter-strike capability based on long-range missiles and anti-ballistic missiles to shoot down weapons targeting its territory. Specifically, it is working on enhancing the range of its own Type 12 missiles and procuring 400 U.S.-made Tomahawk missiles with a range of 1,600 km, capable of hitting China as well as North Korea, the two nations it fears the most. By declaring itself an arms-exporting nation, it is abandoning the restraint previously accepted under pressure from the U.S., which had bombed it into an abject surrender in 1945. By intending to recruit thousands of cyber specialists in its self-defence forces, Japan is also preparing to face the rapidly growing menace of cyber warfare, another forte of the People’s Republic of China. A doubling of the annual defence expenditure to 2% of GDP by 2027 (approximately US $315 billion), as envisaged in the DBP, would make Japan the third-largest military spender, next only to the U.S. and China.
Policymakers in Japan are cognizant that whatever the ingredients of its NDS or DBP for the future, the nation has not proactively built its military forces for almost 80 years. Consequently, it won’t be able to match the size and defence capabilities of China or the nuclear-equipped North Korea for quite a few years. Seeking alliances with others remains imperative. At a Quad meeting in Tokyo—of which Japan is a member, along with the USA, Australia, and India—that was held soon after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Japanese Premier Kishida had observed that the Russian action had “fundamentally shaken the rule-based international order.” The situation for Japan and others in the Far East further worsened when, in the same year, China and Russia entered into a “no-limit partnership”, a relationship reiterated several times since then, including a couple of days ago when President Putin was visiting Beijing.
Since its formation in 2017, Japan has been a member of the Quad, a loose platform for diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. However, despite its recent resurrection, it is hardly adequate to effectively face the emerging security-related challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, both Australia and India do not yet fully favour Quad’s strategic elements. Nor is the American indication to consider making Japan a second pillar member of AUKUS—a new military grouping of Australia, UK, and USA. Such a status would, at most, associate it in co-development and sharing advanced capabilities in limited areas such as hypersonic, anti-submarine warfare, cyber weapons, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. Such “quasi-alliances” cannot be perceived as meaningful deterrents for the Chinese or the North Koreans, who have assiduously built their vast arsenal of versatile and lethal weaponry.
By baulking during the Trump Administration and demanding Japan pay for the American troops stationed there, a high degree of uncertainty favouring China and North Korea came to be introduced. Despite the deterioration of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, Western nations have hitherto taken a “soft balancing” approach. They, and the US in particular, need to play a more comprehensive role in combating the rapidly growing aggressiveness of China and North Korea since they have as much at stake in maintaining the status quo in the Far East and the entire Indo-Pacific. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to further embolden China vis-a-vis Taiwan and aggravate the ongoing threats to others in the region.
Offering Japan membership in the more effective North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a purely military grouping of the USA and Western European nations promoted during the Cold War, would be an appropriate and significant measure. After the split of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO has expanded to include the bordering Eastern European nations and now a couple of Scandinavian nations following the Russian adventurism. Under NATO’s constitution, an attack on one of the members by an external force is considered an assault on all, and the joint defence responsibility gets invoked. Such a measure should provide a high degree of assurance of security to Japan, for whom the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait provide vital trade linkages to the rest of the world.
In a bid to ostensibly send a message to China against its aggressive postures, President Biden had hosted a trilateral meeting with Premier Kishida and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines in early April 2024. Reportedly, the three heads of government discussed upgrading their defence communication networks, improving the interoperability between their air defence and naval forces, and undertaking greater joint development cum production of missiles, maintenance of warships and aircraft, and joint training of personnel. Kanti Bajpai, of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, recently observed that without binding them into a united military-diplomatic front against China, a loose coalition of secondary states in Asia, promoted by the USA, amounted only to a weak attempt of counterbalancing China and preventing them from falling into a Chinese sphere of influence. This stance is endorsed by John Mearsheimer, an American international political scientist, who summarizes the American involvement as “offshore balancing,” leaving it to the countries of the region to contain China. He also recalled that the US remains in the background to the greatest extent possible.
Post the American presidential elections later this year, increased military alignment by the USA and support for the Quad as well as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) cannot be ruled out. The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific should compel the US to abandon its hands-off approach and take a more direct role. With both India and Japan regularly experiencing threats from China, their assessments and responses are likely to align. As Ravi Velloor of the Straits Times, Singapore, observes, “the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity.” The outside world is urging both nations to raise their defence outlays and improve their defence preparedness. Much greater mutual cooperation in developing and deploying various technologies for military and dual use, evolving supply chains for newer arms, and co-production of hardware are key areas for bilateral cooperation between India and Japan.
Although India has yet to decide on the offer, in 2018, Japan proposed co-production of their versatile US-2 amphibious plane. Kishida had visited India in March 2022 in the backdrop of India’s initially ambivalent response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The visit also signalled Japan’s shift away from strengthening relations with Russia and indicated a closer alignment with the Western world. Continuing Abe’s geo-economic strategy, he is leveraging Japan’s strategic positions in supply chains. He has supported the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to enhance American engagement in the region and counterbalance China’s growing economic influence. Japan aims to serve as a bridge between the West and Asia, emphasizing that the conflict in Ukraine could be a precursor to similar tensions in East Asia. Japan’s recent active participation in international forums such as the G-7, G-20, Quad, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) underscores this approach. These developments bode well for India and Japan to intensify their collaborative efforts and elevate their bilateral ties.
The existing special nature of India-Japan ties stands demonstrated in a variety of actions. For the last several years, Japan has been the largest aid giver (ODA) to India. Hundreds of large and medium projects in diverse fields have been funded by it. These include infrastructure projects in power generation, metro rail systems, a dedicated freight train, an under-construction high-speed passenger rail between Mumbai and Ahmedabad, as well as highways, port and shipping. Significant assistance has been given for agriculture, dairying, fisheries and a variety of social projects. A joint funding arrangement of JPY1.2 trillion (US$ 10 bn ) has been created to boost Japanese manufacturing projects in India.
The current optimism in ties between India and Japan is tempered when delving into past trends. Bilateral trade has remained minuscule, with China invariably being a bigger trade partner for Japan. Since 1957, when Prime Minister Kishi was invited by Pandit Nehru to visit India, the overall relationship has undoubtedly moved forward but not without hiccups, particularly during the Cold War years until the 1990s. Only in the 2000s, under Prime Ministers Mori and Vajpayee, did the bilateral relations acquire significant momentum. S. Jaishankar, India’s current Foreign Minister who has served in Japan, in his recent book “The India Way” (in which he devotes a full chapter to Japan titled “A Delayed Destiny”), observes, “A Japan that was firmly placed in an alliance was not easy to engage in the past… Much closer India relations with the US have made it a facilitator rather than an obstacle to India-Japan ties.”
Most Japanese no longer see India as plagued by excessive “bureaucratic socialism,” where, like in other third-world countries, it was difficult to get things done. Increasingly, they view it as a giant market with high economic performance and potential, based on its quick-learning, vast workforce. Similarly, Indian policymakers and businesses would do well to better appreciate Japan’s immense strength in modern technology, project execution abilities, and the availability of financial resources for investment rather than complain about their “ringi,” or the layered and time-taking process of according to approvals to anything new.
Dr Ajay Dua, a development economist, is an ex Union Secretary Commerce & Industry.
